| |
Report to the
Ombudsman of Ontario regarding a number of irregularities
of process under the Environmental Assessment Act (EAA)
|
17 August, 2005 Ms. Winsome Cain, Investigator Complaint Services Ombudsman Ontario 125 Queens Park Toronto, Ontario M5S 2C7
Tel: (416) 586-3300 Fax: 1-866-863-2560
Dear Ms. Cain,
RE: Ombudsman Ontario File No. 173311
In reference to the file opened by your office,
thank you for providing us with the official response from the
Ministry of the Environment (MOE) under cover of your letter dated
26 July 2005. Your office’s willingness to hear our position in
this matter is truly appreciated and we are hopeful that you can
apply the required influence to finally have our concerns dealt
with appropriately. The Deputy Minister of the Environment’s 21
July 2005 letter to you is an instance of what may be described as
the MOE’s standard response to the numerous complaints it has
received in relation to this Class EA. It has provided a selective
chronology of events that occurred as part of the Class EA,
without addressing the outstanding issues that reveal the
proponent’s failure to satisfy to the requirements of the
Environmental Assessment Act (EAA).
In what follows, although we will focus on a
number of irregularities of process under the EAA, we would like
you to keep the following question at the forefront of your mind:
"Does it make sense to directly route a pipe
containing high-pressure, untreated sewage, and human pathogens
that have been implicated in serious illnesses and fatalities,
through a community whose only source of potable water occurs in
the ground where the pipe is laid, especially when a much less
expensive alternative which poses no threat whatsoever is
available and being used in neighbouring communities of the same
City?"
It is our contention that,
had the EA process
been properly followed in this case, the outcome would have
definitively answered the above question in the negative. By
reviewing, one by one, the outstanding issues, which the Deputy
Minister’s letter fails to address, we endeavor to convince you
that this contention has far greater support than you have been
led to believe.
Dissenting Views
To begin with, we would like to make you aware
of the fact that both public and professional opinion has
gone against the alternative that has been implemented by the City
of Ottawa.
A number of other community and environmental
organizations support the RVA’s position. This includes the
Friends of the Jock River, the Greenspace-Alliance of Canada’s
Capital, Ottawa Citizens against Pollution by Sewage, the Ottawa
Office of the Sierra Club of Canada, the Munster Citizen’s
Watchdog Committee and the City of Ottawa’s own Environmental
Advisory Committee.
Furthermore,
the RVA’s position has been
corroborated by one of the province’s most prominent environmental
lawyers, Mr. Rod Northey, who, after considerable research, stated
that the manner in which the
Class EA was conducted involves
illegalities in relation to the requirements of the EAA. Mr.
Northey’s views are elaborated upon below.
Over the last decade, the proponent has been
involved in a series of environmental assessments, technical
studies and Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) hearings related to this
matter. Significantly, the recommendations of these studies and
hearings are at odds with one another. The original 1996
Environmental Study Report (ESR), by Totten Sims Hubicki
Associates, found strongly in favour of rehabilitating the
existing on-site system, rejecting a forcemain on grounds that it
would cost too much and it was the alternative involving the
greatest risk. Another consultant, Conestoga-Rovers & Associates,
was subsequently brought in to investigate on-site options that
were based on newer technology,
only to suddenly and inexplicably
introduce the pipeline alternative in the middle of the process of
evaluating bids against an RFP that called exclusively for
innovative on-site treatment facilities. The Conestoga-Rovers &
Associates’ study, which has been adopted as an addendum to the
original ESR, found in favour of a forcemain, with the preferred
alternative being that it connect to the Richmond Pumping Station.
Despite growing community opposition to this
"preferred
alternative" and serious questions about procedural errors,
several Part II Order requests were denied by the Minister of the
Environment.
An OMB hearing sat on the matter and found the
1999 Conestoga-Rovers & Associates’ addendum inadequate, ordering
the City to hire an independent consultant to re-evaluate the
alternatives. The resulting study by R.V. Anderson, released in
late 2002, rejected the pipeline option and advised the City to
conduct a competition between the two on-site options that had
submitted bids in response to the 1999 RFP. Instead, the City
ignored the OMB proceedings and associated outcomes entirely, and
approached the MOE on the basis of the discredited 1999 ESR
addendum. It is on this basis that the MOE has allowed the project
to proceed to Phase 5 of the Class EA process.
Consultation with the Public Inadequate
In the second paragraph of the Deputy
Minister’s letter, it states that, as part of the Class EA,
"consultation with the public [is] incorporated into the planning
and development of these types of projects." Be that as it may,
the question which must be considered is: "When evaluated against
the standards given in the Municipal Class EA 2000 (MCEA), the
applicable regulation of the EAA, is the City’s consultation
strategy found to be adequate?" We believe that the answer must be
given in the negative. This answer is based on consideration of
the phasing of the proponent’s public consultation strategy, which
specifically sought the input of Richmond residents, and other
residents along the pipeline route, only after
Conestoga-Rovers & Associates selected the pipeline alternative as
the preferred alternative. The MCEA says:
"The proponent should seek to involve
potentially affected parties as early as possible, so that their
concerns can be identified and addressed before irreversible
decisions are made. . . . Potentially affected parties include
technical agencies, the public, property owners, interest groups
and other municipalities." (MCEA p. A-2, our italics)
The City did not meet this standard in
undertaking the mandatory public consultations during Phase 2 of
the project. In fact, the past president of the
RVA, Mr. Ted
Brown, was told by the municipal representative, Mrs. Janet
Stavinga, that the views of Richmond residents were not being
sought because she did not want to cause unnecessary alarm before
a final decision was made to pipe sewage to Richmond.
The first opportunity for two of the three
stakeholder communities – i.e. Richmond and Stittsville -
to participate in public consultation was for the route selection.
At that time only one Stittsville and one Richmond representative
sat on the Public Liaison Committee (PLC) in contrast to three
Munster and one Heron Lakes Estates members. We believe that this
constitutes biased representation on the PLC. Furthermore, when
the municipality finally sought the input of Richmond residents
through the PLC, it seemingly forgot an integral characteristic of
the Class EA process:
"[It] is not necessarily sequential. It can be
an iterative process whereby the results of one step may
necessitate reevaluation of a previous step." (MCEA p. A-24).
This is not how the preferred solution
was presented to Richmond residents, or residents of other
potentially affected communities. Members of the PLC for the route
selection were required to avow their support for the pipeline
alternative. However, they should have been mandated to assess the
concerns of their respective communities for the purpose of
deciding whether the route should be to Richmond, Stittsville, one
of the three other alternatives or whether the process should
undergo an iteration back to the stage of assessing wastewater
treatment alternatives. By not including the latter
possibility and by failing to consult Richmond in the earliest
stages of Phase 2, the proponent effectively ensured that Richmond
would not be able to provide input on the full range of
alternatives to the one that would affect it most. In summary, the
City’s consultation strategy did not allow Richmond residents to
have a say in the selection of the technology, only in the
selection of the pipeline route.
The failure to properly identify and adequately
consult stakeholders "as early as possible" has resulted in the
interests and public good of an entire community being ignored.
This amounts to more than 5000 people including the residents of
Richmond and those along the 11km pipeline route to Richmond,
whose potable water supply is completely unprotected.
A Piecemealed Project
Phase 1 of the Class EA process is intended to
accomplish the identification of the problem or opportunity that
the Class EA will address. In undertaking to achieve this end, a
proponent is prohibited from "piecemealing" a project, i.e.,
attempting to break up a larger project into smaller component
parts, with each part addressed separately. Mr. Rod Northey’s
research into the Munster Treatment Facility Expansion/Upgrade
Class EA focuses on Phase 1 compliance issues, and concludes that
this Class EA and another Class EA, the Richmond Pumping Station
and Forcemain Upgrade, were piecemealed.
Mr. Northey reviewed all relevant master plans,
assessments and technical studies relating to both Class EA’s. He
states that it is clear that Totten Sims Hubicki Associates’ ESR
and its problem statement deal with Munster exclusively.
Regarding
the Conestoga-Rovers & Associates addendum, he writes that this
consultant had no mandate to re-assess the Phase 1 work for the
project presented in the original ESR. However, the recommended
solution given in the addendum involves transporting all Munster
sewage into a pipeline that enters the Richmond Pumping Station.
Furthermore, at least some of the time, the Richmond Pumping
Station does not have the capacity to receive the Munster
waste. Hence, the addendum recommends a solution that expands the
problem beyond Munster to include Richmond. Richmond becomes part
of the problem. Accordingly, the Conestoga-Rovers & Associates’
addendum creates the need for, but does not provide a new Phase 1
assessment. A new Phase I assessment is needed to include both
Munster and Richmond because the proposed solution creates a
problem at both Munster and Richmond, even if this is not a
problem the majority of the time.
Furthermore, Mr. Northey finds that the required
Phase 1 re-assessment is not provided for in any other document
such as the 1999 ESR for Richmond Pumping Station and Forcemain
Upgrade, the 1997 Regional Master Plan, the 1997 Wastewater Master
Plan and the 2003 Infrastructure Master Plan.
Mr. Northey concludes the following:
"The Munster-Richmond project does not appear
to comply with Phases 1 and 2 of the Class EA unless, somehow, the
project assessment displaces both Master Plans; however, if
the project assessment does have this power, there is a further
problem with the Class EA: the present project appears to be at
odds with 1996 TSH problem statement which addresses Munster only,
not Richmond, and thus does not comply with Phase 1 of the Class
EA and no aspect of the subsequent 1999 Addendum or terms
of reference suggest that it amends Phase 1 of the TSH Report.
Instead, all subsequent documents seem to advise that the 1999
study addresses Phase 2 of the Class EA process."
He further concludes:
On the basis of our current review, we also conclude that the
approach of CRA to expand the project from a Munster-only project
to a Munster-Richmond project is an example of piecemealing and is
therefore contrary to the Class EA and EA Act.
This is what the RVA expected. The
Conestoga-Rovers & Associates addendum contains a 12 August 1998
letter from Mr. Adrien Comeau to the project manager, Mr. Stephen
Forestell, indicating that addition of Munster’s sewage to
Richmond’s Pumping Station and Forcemain system will increase
occurrences of flows exceeding system capacity from once every two
years to one to two times per year. At this time the Richmond
Pumping Station and Forcemain Upgrade Class EA was in Phase 2,
evaluating solutions to nothing other than the problem of flows
exceeding system capacity. The Munster Treatment Facility
Expansion/Upgrade Class EA was also in Phase 2, evaluating
alternative forcemain routes to solve the sewage treatment problem
in Munster. According to the Municipal Class EA, the proponent had
a responsibility to review and confirm the status of both projects
and if "the problem as originally defined [in both EA’s was] no
longer valid" redefine the problem statement (MCEA, pp. A-28,
A-30). The problem statement for any project has to be developed
to prevent piecemealing the project into component parts, with
each being treated as a separate project (MCEA, p. A-25). Although
both Class EA’s had the same project manager (in fact they have
had a succession of common project managers) no redefinition of
the project problem was done to prevent piecemealing.
Technological Limitations not Acknowledged
The City of Ottawa and the MOE have failed to
acknowledge the limitations of the technology required for the
preferred alternative identified by Conestoga-Rovers & Associates.
The City’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system
is of particular concern, given that it is known to be unable to
detect leaks resulting from cracks in the forcemain. This fact has
been brought to the attention of the MOE, and no response to the
concern has been forthcoming in over a year. There are also
serious questions concerning the material used for the forcemain.
At no time throughout the Class EA process has the City or the MOE
proven certification or issued any reports that detail rigourous
testing to realistic, long-life environmental exposure of this
plastic piping material under the pressures and flows to which it
is expected to be subjected.
Since the 1999 addendum was completed,
information has become available concerning the cracking and
eventual rupturing of the Richmond to Glen Cairn forcemain,
downstream of the Munster to Richmond forcemain. The evaluation of
the cause of the two ruptures in this forcemain, which occurred
during 2001 and 2002, concluded, "pressurized liquid and sand/silt
escaping the system through a crack eroded the plastic material
[of the forcemain pipe] in a fan shape, likely over the span of
several weeks or months." The existing SCADA system failed to
detect the crack and resulting leak. This information was released
in August 2003, with the David McManus Engineering Ltd. –
Environmental Hydraulics Group Inc. Hydraulic Transient
Analysis of the Richmond Pump Station and Force Main Break
Investigation. At this time, the Munster Hamlet Wastewater
Treatment System Expansion/Upgrade Class EA had already entered
Phase 5.
A review of the documents produced during
Phases 1 to 3 of the Class EA demonstrates that the possibility of
such long-term leakage from the Munster to Richmond forcemain was
not addressed, either because the pipeline alternative was
rejected, as in the original ESR, or because it was erroneously
believed that the proponent’s SCADA system would readily detect
leakage from the forcemain.
Conestoga-Rovers & Associates’ addendum
acknowledges that Richmond obtains most of its potable water
supply from private, shallow wells. It also acknowledges that
wells without water-tight casings within at least 30m of the
planned force main, and with a minimally thick clay
overburden,
will be "a concern" in case of a leak in the pipeline. It
concludes, however, that because of Richmond’s clay overburden
"Richmond wells would be at minimal risk
from short-term pipeline
failure, if it were to occur."
It dismisses the possibility of
long-term failure and leakage with the following statement: "[L]eakage
can be readily detectable through pipeline instrumentation and
control. ... Therefore, the likelihood for sewage leakage to a
potable water supply drawing from a shallow or deep aquifer is
low." On the basis of this statement, no evaluation of potential
impacts from long-term leaks is given in the addendum.
The new information provided in the
Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Richmond Pump Station and
Force Main Break Investigation demonstrates that
long-term
leakage is a risk to Richmond’s potable water supply that was not
assessed during the Munster Hamlet Wastewater Treatment System
Expansion/Upgrade Class EA. The proponent’s SCADA system failed to
detect a pressurized leak for several weeks or months. The leak
was only discovered because transient hydraulic pressure
eventually ruptured the force main. Therefore the risk of
long-term leakage cannot be dismissed, and the assessment of
public health concerns during the Munster Hamlet Wastewater
Treatment System Expansion/Upgrade Class EA was incomplete.
Conclusion
Despite the work that has been undertaken by
volunteers of the RVA to make our case, our concerns have thus far
been ignored. We have not embarked on this journey lightly and we
do it for no other reason than to protect our potable water supply
and to assure the health and survival of our community.
At all
times, it has been our position that it does not make sense to
route a high pressure, waste-filled pipe through the same ground
from which we draw our potable water. We have attempted, in the
foregoing, to demonstrate where non-compliances with the EAA by
the proponent, with the concurrence of the MOE, has resulted in an
unacceptable threat to our community. We are seeking a moratorium
on the operation of the Munster to Richmond pipeline and an
opportunity to open a new EA for the treatment of the Munster
Hamlet’s sewage. We ask you to find in favour of our arguments and
require the MOE to act accordingly. If you wish additional
clarification of our position, please do not hesitate to contact
the undersigned or Mr. Harvey Snyder at (613) 838-3572.
Yours truly,
Mr. Bruce Webster
Vice-President Richmond Village Association P.O. Box 492 Richmond, Ontario K0A 2Z0
Tel: (613) 838-2056
|
|
|