1.) The main agenda item at the Trail Road Leachate Management PLC meeting (#2a), April 28, 2004, was to discuss the public preferences obtained from Comment Sheets, available at the April 14, 2004 Open House, that were filled in by residents who attended the event.

The public left no doubt that the solution they prefer is an on-site solution. Here are the numbers compiled, (by the consultant team), from the Comment Sheets:  

The main reasons stated by the public, in their support of an on-site solution, included:

2.) While the unequivocal sentiments of the public were also reflected in the comments of most PLC members, the reaction of city staff, present at the PLC meeting, was quite a different matter.

Engineering staff bias, in support of the pipeline option, was quite evident throughout the meeting. Staff opinion and comment dominated the proceedings with frequent misrepresentation of the facts, faulty interpretations of real or imagined risk (depending on the option being discussed). Given the public’s unequivocal preference for on-site treatment, (as expressed in the Comment Sheets), the city staff presence appeared equally clearly intended to obfuscate the truth, and sabotage the public interest, along with disrupting the function of the public volunteer-members of the PLC in their sincere efforts to serve the public interest. The city’s engineers exceeded their mandate by going well beyond their function as technical resources for the PLC.

3.) The majority of PLC members present agreed that their paramount concern, (as, that of the public), was for "public safety". For example, the "plausible worst-case scenario"- fear of undetectable, slow, forcemain leaks was expressed by one member, as posing "unnecessary risk", compared to the localized containment superiority of the on-site options (i.e.: zero-percent public risk). The member used the five forcemain ruptures in Richmond as an example. One of the city officials, present, immediately retorted that the Richmond breaks were all "construction digging accidents". Luckily the PLC member had his facts straight and was able to correct the city official with information, that while the risk of digging accidents poses an ever-present "additional hazard", (not present by any on-site solutions), the truth remains that the five Richmond forcemain breaks were all spontaneous ruptures, the last one of which, (according to the McMannus Engineering Report of August, 2003), had continued for "several weeks to months" without being detected. The city official changed the subject.

4.) While the obfuscative-tenor of the meeting, (typified by the above incident), continued throughout the evening, the worst "coup de théâtre", was yet to be played out. One of the city engineers suggested that the overwhelming public support for the on-site solution caused a real "conundrum" for the city; (Go figure …It certainly did, if the city had pre-determined to go with the pipeline!).

The engineer’s unabashed recommendation was that the PLC suspend the due process of verifying the transparent and systematic ranking the options, according to their merits and demerits, (by listing in order of preference for the various on-site solutions, or listing priority of the numerous pipeline route options). Instead, he proposed that the PLC Committee select what they believe to be the best of the on-site solutions, along with what they believe to be the best of the pipeline routes (ignoring all else) …then leave it to city staff to recommend to council what THEY wish to choose as the most "politically acceptable" option.

One PLC member was quick to respond that, "We refuse to prostitute ourselves, by not doing what we are here to do". Several others appeared to agree. The city representative then stated that it was merely a suggestion, in order to shorten a difficult process. The consultant, chairing the meeting, suggested that rather than dismiss it out-of-hand, right now, perhaps committee members could think about the suggestion, and could vote on it at the next PLC meeting in a week’s time.

At least two of the PLC members took strong exception to the posting, (at the April 14^th Open House), of ‘wild-guess’ price estimates on the pipeline in the $2,000,000-range, and on the on-site treatment option in $10,000,000-range. Without supporting data, these figures gave the appearance of being contrived to maneuver opinion away from the on-site option, in favour of the forcemain option. It was all the more cynical if it had the ultimate effect of swaying council away from the public’s more important health and safety concerns, solely as the result of, speciously contrived, false cost estimates. In any case, most PLC members thought the pipeline cost figure was inordinately low, and the on-site system costs figure was inordinately high …and that, without supporting documentation, any mention of costing at this early stage was extremely out-of-order.

One other topic of discussion, before the meeting was adjourned, was the relative performance of on-site treatment plants (such as that proposed for the Trail Road landfill site) compared with the ROPEC treatment plant, during a hydro-power blackout. One of the PLC members pointed out that during the August 2003 blackout, all of the smaller on-site sewage and leachate treatment plants, in the affected areas of Ontario and northern US, had power generators which took over and kept the facilities running at normal efficiencies, while the ROPEC plant was discharging improperly treated sewage into the Ottawa River the whole time.

A city engineer quickly stated that the ROPEC plant was also switched to auxiliary power, and did not discharge improperly treated sewage into the river.

One of the public observers (non-PLC member) interjected that the city engineer’s statement was incorrect, and that ROPEC did, in fact, discharge improperly treated sewage into the Ottawa River, and that it was widely reported in the media to have continued for days after power was restored.

The Chair of the meeting (from the CRA consultant firm), lashed out at the public citizen, to cease talking, since public observers are not allowed to speak.

Next PLC Meeting: May 5th, 2004, 7:00 pm

1.) Consultant started the meeting by reading the duties of the PLC, and bluntly stating to everyone that their job was NOT to choose the preferred solution. While public members of the committee agreed that they did not make the final decision, they strongly asserted that the public should have considerable sway in getting the solution they prefer. Otherwise, why even put on a charade of having public participation? The PLC members reiterated that there was no doubt that the public, so far, has expressed an overwhelmingly clear preference for an on-site solution.

The next hour of the May 5^th PLC meeting was spent as a tug of war between the public members and the city. The public members wanted to enshrine the clear public support (expressed in the Comment Sheets), in the form of a motion of understanding.

The matter was finally resolved with the Chair of the meeting allowing the motion:

2.)

City demeans the intelligence of citizens who attended public open houses, and labels the turnout, "unrepresentative"

The city marginalized the public comments as being "uninformed", and "unrepresentative of the population, in terms of numbers of Open House attendees, relative to the population as a whole". PLC members pointed out that the written comments on the Comment Sheets (see summation read by the Chair, at last PLC meeting), demonstrated that the public was very intelligent and well informed. As far as the city’s criticism of the degree of public participation, PLC members were quick to point out that a low turnout at the public meetings might more accurately reflect on poor notification efforts on the part of the city. Since this is a city-wide issue of great importance, it was suggested that, perhaps, every household should receive mailed notices of all public meetings pertaining to the Trail Road problem. As to the city’s suggestion that the comments of the 65 people who turned out must be discounted, because they do not reflect the opinion of the 60,000 residents of Nepean, PLC members were quick to suggest that the 65, WERE the ones who turned out ---both for and against the pipeline--- and therefore, they ARE representative of the population as a whole.

3.)

Ministry of the Environment (MOE) nixes the city’s
"One-out-of-Two-Plot"

The Consultant/Chair of the PLC stated he had questioned MOE on the city’s proposal of having the PLC narrow the alternatives to their favourite choice of the on-site treatment alternatives, and their favourite choice of the pipeline routes, and then leave it to city staff to recommend to council, what they thought was the best alternative.

(It’s still hard to believe that city engineers actually tried to pull such a stunt!)

The MOE stated that it was NOT in favour of such an approach, because it would be setting a new precedent that was out of character with the Environmental Assessment (EA) process. MOE would like to see one solution identified through the normal EA process.

Therefore, advancement of the city’s scheme had to be dropped by the PLC Chair.

4.)

PLC Chair, (the city's consultant), taints public Comment Sheet results by including comment sheets filled out by the "Project Team". 

Paid consultants and city engineering staff should not be contaminating the  public's inputs ---with their own preconceived opinions--- then presenting the distorted information as "public opinion", or using it for evaluation purposes.

At the April 14, 2004, Open House, the public was presented with "Comment Sheets" which led off with, "We are interested in your opinion on the relative importance of various Primary Criteria and Sub Criteria"... 

If that were truly the case, why then, would paid consultants (Conestoga-Rovers and Associates) feel the need to alter the inputted stats, comprised of the publics' comments, by mixing in their own (or the city's) conflicting viewpoints, thus skewing the pure public record?

No constructive, worthwhile or honorable purpose can be seen, by diluting documentation of the public comments. Such practice could be considered as dishonest manipulation of a historical record, and must not be tolerated. Only comments from the public-at-large, and from the public members of the PLC, are acceptable for this record, and for evaluation purposes!

5.)

The "Risk Assessment" Issue:

Most of the remainder of the evening (up to adjournment time of approximately 11:20 pm) was spent on conflicting interpretations of how to assess risk of the three main alternatives (i.e.: pipeline transmission, trucking, and on-site treatment).

6.) Without getting into all of the possible combinations of the three core options, a lot of the discussion hinged around "experts" attempting to convince the "non-expert" public PLC members that the forcemain was as safe as the on-site option.

7.) The meeting adjourned with both sides of the safety argument frustrated and distrusting of the one-another.

Stay tuned.

(Next PLC Meeting is Wednesday, May 19^th, 2004.)

1.) The Chair started the meeting by announcing that the purpose that night was to go through the evaluation methodology, and go through examples of how the evaluation criteria will be applied in the "actual" evaluation, by the "evaluation team". The chair announced that results of the completed evaluation would be presented at the very next PLC Meeting. This meant that the consultants would be announcing their preferred alternative in less than two weeks time.

One of the public members of the PLC committee noted that the city appeared to be biased toward a pipeline, and seemed to be rushing toward a pipeline decision with undue haste …even before conducting a proper risk assessment on the various options.

He stated that it appears obvious, to most residents (as evidenced by their comment sheets), that the on-site option was safer than the pipeline option. This is because the off-site treatment (involving a pipeline to another location, i.e.: ROPEC) would have a built-in "risk multiplier", that being the transport element.

The member went on to state that the public (through the Comment Sheets) expressed virtually 99% favour in the on-site option, for reasons of public health and safety (via Social Environment). He interpreted the public as saying, "To heck with the cost, I want health and safety".

He concluded, by saying that with health and safety being so important, the evaluation team therefore would be remiss if it made a selection, without doing a "risk assessment" of the alternatives.

With other PLC members agreeing, the Chair (CRA-Consultant) surprised everyone by stating that a "risk assessment" was NOT part of their work program. Since it was not in their work scope, it would not be done.

One member implied that lack of a risk assessment would negate the entire evaluation process, making a mockery of the valid public concern for "safety first". He stated that, "Risk avoidance is paramount."

(One city engineer jeered, "That’s your opinion; it’s probably irrelevant!")

The Chair added, that the consultant would not even know how to do a risk assessment, if asked to do one. The same public PLC member (who is an engineer) told the Chair that, if he wanted to get together after the meeting, he "would explain to him how to do one".

The PLC member was not taken up on his offer.

2.) The ensuing "Evaluation Matrix Methodology –101" was next on the agenda. While one would think that equating everything to numbers would clarify the process, it quickly became apparent that the Matrix application in the Trail Road case, will be fraught with potential "fatal flaws", due to double meanings causing reverse interpretations, bad city intentions, and possibly many skewed interpretations.

For example, the consultant’s ‘evaluation process guru’ explained that "groundwater quality" meant that, "since the pipeline would help groundwater quality, locally, by removing toxins, it would derive top points as an alternative (10 out of 10)". (This appears to be a complete reversal of the public interpretation of the groundwater issue. Since both the pipeline and the onsite alternatives are assumed to be capable of improving groundwater quality at the Trail Road site, this is not really the question, is it? The real question on peoples’ minds, when filling out the Comment Sheets, is not whether the alternatives perform their functions ---at the site--- it is what are the negative (or positive) implication of possible contingencies ---beyond the Trail Road site. One can quickly see why the pipeline could fare quite badly, on points--- with the consideration of a forcemain rupture--- whereas (as mentioned earlier), the on-site option could contain leachate throughout any break-down event, simply by turning the treatment plant OFF, and temporarily trucking or storing the material until treatment could resume.

One can readily see why it is critically important that the evaluation team NOT misconstrue the PUBLIC INTERPRETATION, and real significance of this question.

PLC members were quick to identify the real negatives in considering the pipeline option were, a.) the issue of groundwater quality along the entire forcemain route, and, b.) the fact that the pipeline would be transferring groundwater from the area, (which would not occur in the case of an on-site treatment plant). Neither of these two negatives were considered in the consultant’s erroneous full point rating for the pipeline vis-à-vis "groundwater quality".

Another example of impending "erroneous" scoring followed shortly when the evaluation expert suggested merging the equating of risk from a pipeline rupture with that of a truck over-turning. Many of the PLC members could not see any advantage to doing that. And CRA could not really explain any. When the consultant team was grilled by members as to any potential downsides to merging the two, the evaluation process expert did admit that the ranking of public concern over a pipeline rupture would be diluted from 63% down to 39%. One of the PLC members emphatically said, "We’re talking about probabilities, here. We shouldn’t tamper with probabilities". All public members appeared to agree to stay with "independent probabilities". It is not known if the "evaluation team" will adhere to that request.

3.) Finally, before the PLC meeting was adjourned, each member was handed a 21-page, "TECHNICAL BRIEF ON DESCRIPTION OF ON-SITE TREATMENT TECHNOLOGIES".

While some PLC (public) members agreed that the document makes an interesting read, they were not entirely certain to what purpose the document was intended …given the city’s overwhelming bias towards the forcemain alternative. One could get the distinct impression that the city would like to make the onsite treatment option look overly complicated, and thus, hopefully, lead PLC members to the city’s viewpoint that it would be better to use dilution in the Ottawa River as the solution to pollution.

After the meeting adjourned, some members wondered why they were not given a similar "technical brief" on the problems and risks associated with forcemain transmission of leachate. They also expressed the opinion that it might have been far more productive if the consultants had presented a 21-page document giving a detailed description of the many successful on-site leachate treatment systems already in use throughout Canada, the US and Europe.

4.) Public members of the PLC are expressing a growing sense that there appears to be no interest or serious attempt, on the part of the city, to thoroughly look into the advantages of safe, cost-effective on-site technologies, or conversely, to properly assess the technical problems and known risks associated with an unsustainable forcemain option.

5.) The consultants will be (prematurely) presenting their "preferred alternative" at the very next PLC Meeting, on Tuesday, June 1, 2004, to be held at Councillor, Jan Harder’s Campaign Office (behind the library, at the back of the Walter Baker Centre), at 7:00 pm.

Meetings are open to the public.

Stay tuned.

PLC MEETING #3a – June 1, 2004

When confronted with uncomfortable questions, the city’s consultants appeared to resort to insults of PLC member’s intelligence.

1.) Discussion continued as to why members were given hand-outs (at the previous PLC meeting) of “briefing notes” on the technical intricacies of treating leachate with on-site technologies ...when no briefing notes were provided on the challenges associated with long-distance transmission of leachate via forcemain. Public PLC members wanted to obtain equally detailed notes on pipeline stress factors, fluid dynamics, alarm system capabilities and aquifer contamination risk issues.

The consultant cryptically responded, with the apparent put-down, that: “We did not produce the same level of information for pipelines or trucking, because I assumed most of the members of the PLC understood what a pipeline, and what a tank truck, looks like and how it operates.”

2.) The question was raised regarding the feasibility of having an onsite, real-time discharge alarm system.

The CRA consultant, (Greg Ferraro, P.Eng.), replied that “Yes”, but, “ SCADA systems do go down. Lots of times, with SCADA systems, you end up with spending more money repairing a SCADA system, than to do the treatment …for the treatment system that the SCADA system is supposed to monitor.”

3.) The matter of PLC-requested  “Risk Assessment” was contentiously discussed.

The CRA consultant engineer emphasized, “We are not prepared to do a full-fledged risk assessment”. He indicated that they would do a “failure mode evaluation”, then come up with the “mitigative measures to address those risks”, such as double-walled piping in the most sensitive areas.

One of the public PLC members suggested that the best method of “risk avoidance” would be to do a trade-off study where you would be able to avoid the risk entirely by discarding any options that posed a risk.

The consultant's response was that, “None of the technologies will be discarded because of risk!”

4.) One of the city engineers opened a subject which, he stated, completely altered their plans, for that night, to announce a preferred alternative. He explained that the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) had just informed them that long-term migration of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), outside the perimeter of the Trail Road property, had to be considered in the current Environmental Assessment (EA) process.

Since VOCs do not conform to substances permitted to be transported by pipeline, (as specified in the “Sewer Use By-Law”), they would have to be treated on-site.

It was apparent, from the palpable discomfort of the city engineers, present, that the (likely) intended announcement of the pipeline as their recommended “preferred alternative” was now in considerable jeopardy. The combining (under a unified, rather than piecemealed, EA), of all of the Trail Road problems, (especially in light of the VOC problem), is the only inclusive and tenable approach to the three related site issues. But it would also cause the on-site treatment option to be the most logical and “obvious solution” for all three problems ...including the leachate problem.

City staff appealed to the public PLC members to consider recommending to the city that they NOT prefer combining the problems under the one EA. City staff appeared to want to be able to put pressure on the MOE, by saying that the PLC members were against the idea. However, the PLC members did not buy it.

The PLC members appeared to be catching onto the fact that city was likely recommending separation of the issues, so that they could press on with their pipeline preference. The PLC members did not give the city its requested support.

It remains to be seen whether MOE folds under pressure from the city, over this matter.

5.) Next Meeting: June 21, 2004 – 7:30 pm - PLC Meetings are OPEN TO THE PUBLIC

Location: Walter Baker Community Centre, Jan Harder’s constituency office, (at back of building, left of Public Library entrance).

PLC Meeting #3b - June 21, 2004

All PLC meetings were abruptly suspended "until September".

This appears to be a stalling tactic, by the city, because of the momentum that is gathering in favour of an on-site treatment solution for Trail Road ---mainly on account of the onsite technology's containment and safety advantages.

[On-site technology was clearly the best solution for Munster's sewage treatment, as well. However, the city has already started constructing an illicit forcemain which would push pressurized sewage through Richmond's shallow aquifer ---posing the same groundwater risks which were deemed unacceptable by the public, and public members of the Trail Road PLC Committee.

The city appears to believe, that by delaying the Trail Road proceedings, it can sneak through with its targeted completion date of September 2004, on the risky Munster-Richmond forcemain.

Most residents, who are aware of the situation, find the city's actions to be totally irresponsible and abhorrent. The Munster forcemain "solution" is costing taxpayers 1000% more than an on-site solution, and at the same time, putting well-water users at continuous certain risk (as opposed to 100% protection of their water source, with an on-site solution at Munster).]

Next Meetings are the FINAL meetings:

PLC Meeting #4 - October 20th, 2004

Very little, if anything, was accomplished at this meeting of the PLC.

The public members of the committee were told by the evaluation team (i.e.: city staff and the city's hired consultants, Conestoga-Rovers and Associates), that after a summer (June 21st to Oct 20th) of having meetings WITHOUT the public committee members being allowed to attend: their services would no longer be needed. (Some transparency!)

The evaluation team announced that they now had a preferred option to present to the public (in just six days time, on October 26th), but they still would not disclose to the public members of the PLC what their selection was. (Again, where is the transparency?)

One got the sense, that if they had something to hide from the "Public Liaison" Committee ---that badly, at this late stage of the game--- then the city's choice was certain to be a pipeline.

A pipeline choice would appear to defy good engineering practice, ignore the precautionary principle, fail to practice the ethical engineering requirement of considering a 'plausible worst case scenario safety evaluation', and flew completely in the face of the public's major safety concerns, and against everyone's common sense and logic -- (aside from that of city engineers ...along with their paid consultants). And they knew it!

The public members of the PLC had worked too-diligently in the public interest: the PLC was now officially disbanded ---even though they, independently, continue to act in the public interest.

As in the Munster-Richmond pipeline scandal, it now appeared that, for the Trail Road Leachate management issue: THE FIX WAS IN!

View observers report to Planning and Environment Committee

NOTICE OF PUBLIC MEETING:

PUBLIC OPEN HOUSE - Tuesday, October 26, 2004: (OH: 5-7 pm)
Formal Presentation: 7:00 pm

NEW LOCATION:   Nepean Sportsplex - Woodroffe Ave. -Salon "A"

WARNING!

You can see by all of the city's "smoke and mirror" tactics, (detailed in the notes regarding the PLC meetings, reported above), that the city's preferred solution is likely to be in conflict with the ON-SITE TREATMENT of the Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), and leachate/groundwater, that the public PLC members and the public (at large) clearly requested.

Be present at the 7:00 pm presentation, to defend your correct on-site preference, and to counter the city's false rationales and corrupt arguments for a forcemain solution (for any part of the contaminated material).

Environmental Best Management Practices, protective Health and Safety measures, the Precautionary Principle and wise use of tax dollars, all dictate that: the material must be treated on-site, and the treated groundwater must not be transferred out of the aquifer.

The city's CORRUPT, Munster to Richmond, forcemain project has managed to turn a $3.8-million on-site solution, into a more than $30,000,000 scandal of LIES, DECEPTION, FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, and HEALTH RISK BEYOND THE SCALE OF WALKERTON'S. This sorry case which started in 1998, will still go on for years, before the full details will come out. Eventually, it will be recorded in the courts, engineering journals and history books in the years ahead ---as one of the most sordid cases on record, of mismanagement, incompetence, corruption, and maleficence.

The Munster fiasco is even worse than the previous $50,000,000 Ottawa South Collector scandal.

Don't let the same incompetent city engineering staff and bungling politicians that oversaw these other two projects, repeat their follies on the Trail Road Leachate/VOC management issue ---at the risk to health of the South Nepean residents of Stonebridge and/or Barrhaven, and rural area!

 Public Open House  - (Oct 26/04)- Results reported:

City's consultants recommend transporting Trail Road leachate by pressurized forcemain.

Link to Ottawa Citizen's meeting coverage (October 27): CLICK HERE